Event type
Inbox Rule Created with External Forwarding
New-InboxRule - User-level Email Forwarding
Records New-InboxRule operations where users create email forwarding rules, often with external forwarding to bypass administrator controls and exfiltrate sensitive data
Overview
What this event covers
Captures New-InboxRule operations where users create inbox rules to automatically forward emails to external addresses. This is a common technique for data exfiltration and persistence as it bypasses administrator-level mailbox forwarding controls and can be harder to detect.
When generated
- ›User creates a new inbox rule via Outlook or OWA
- ›Attacker with compromised credentials establishes forwarding persistence
- ›Legitimate user sets up external email forwarding for convenience
- ›Automated rule creation by compromised account
Security relevance
HighCompliance
Frequency notes
Medium frequency in normal operations as users create legitimate rules. Suspicious indicators: rules with generic names ('Auto Archive'), external forwarding, keyword-based triggers targeting business content, StopProcessingRules=True, and especially creation during off-hours (4x multiplier for night, 3.5x for weekends).
Resources
Docs and tools
Generation
Configuration
- Base frequency
- 8 events/hour
- Time patterns
- business_hours night_hours weekend
- Business hours
- 2.0x
- Night hours
- 4.0x
- Weekend
- 3.5x
Schema
Field definitions
Field reference for this event type — types, requirements, examples, and allowed values.
CreationTime
Timestamp when the inbox rule was created
Source: now() | iso8601
ISO 86012024-12-15T09:17:33ZId
Unique identifier for this audit record
Source: random_guid()
GUIDf1e2d3c4-b5a6-7c8d-9e0f-1a2b3c4d5e6fOperation
Exchange operation that was performed
Source: Static value 'New-InboxRule'
New-InboxRuleOrganizationId
Microsoft 365 tenant identifier
Source: Derived from organization domain
GUIDb4c5d6e7-8f9a-0b1c-2d3e-4f5a6b7c8d9eRecordType
Office 365 audit log record type (1 = ExchangeAdmin)
Source: Static value 1
1ResultStatus
Outcome of the rule creation operation
Source: random_choice(['Success', 'Success', 'Success', 'Failed'])
Success-
SuccessRule created successfully -
FailedRule creation failed (validation or permission error)
UserKey
Unique identifier for the user who created the rule
Source: registry.get_random_user().email
compromised.user@contoso.comUserType
Type of user creating the rule
Source: random_choice([0, 2])
0-
0Regular user -
2Administrator
Workload
Office 365 service where the operation occurred
Source: Static value 'Exchange'
ExchangeUserId
User principal name of the account that created the rule
Source: registry.get_random_user().email
Email/UPNcompromised.user@contoso.comClientIP
IP address and port from which the rule was created
Source: random_choice([random_public_ip(), random_public_ip(), random_private_ip()]) - weighted toward external IPs
IPv4:Port198.51.100.88:43921ObjectId
Mailbox for which the rule was created
Source: registry.get_random_user().email
Email/UPNcompromised.user@contoso.comExternalAccess
Indicates if the rule was created from outside the corporate network
Source: random_choice(['true', 'true', 'false']) - weighted 67% external
trueOrganizationName
Microsoft 365 tenant name
Source: Derived from organization domain
*.onmicrosoft.comcontoso.onmicrosoft.comOriginatingServer
Exchange server that processed the rule creation
Source: Random Exchange Online server identifier
BN8PR01MB5678 (15.20.7654.32)Parameters
Parameters used when creating the inbox rule
Source: Array of parameter objects defining rule behavior
Parameters[].Name
Parameter name (Name, SubjectContainsWords, ForwardTo, StopProcessingRules, DeleteMessage, Mailbox)
SubjectContainsWordsParameters[].Value
Parameter value - critical fields include ForwardTo (external email), SubjectContainsWords (keywords for targeting), StopProcessingRules (prevents detection)
Source: Context-specific values - keywords target business content, ForwardTo contains external addresses
invoice,payment,urgent,confidentialSessionId
Session identifier for the user connection
Source: random_guid()
GUIDa1b2c3d4-e5f6-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6dClientInfoString
Information about the client used to create the rule (OWA, Outlook, etc.)
Source: Random client type and access method
Client=OWA;Action=ViaProxy;Item
Details about the created inbox rule
Source: Object with rule name and parent folder path
Item.Id
Name of the inbox rule (often benign-sounding to avoid detection)
Source: Random benign-sounding rule name
Auto Archive Important MessagesItem.ParentFolder.Path
Location where the rule is stored
Source: Static value '/Inbox Rules'
/Inbox Rules