Event type
GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring Finding Types
Threat detection based on OS-level runtime behavior
AWS GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring finding types detecting threats based on operating system-level behavior from Amazon EC2 hosts and containers in Amazon EKS clusters, Amazon ECS workloads, and Fargate tasks, including malicious file execution, privilege escalation, container escape, process injection, cryptocurrency mining, command and control activity, and defense evasion techniques
Overview
What this event covers
Runtime Monitoring analyzes operating system-level behavior from EC2 hosts and containers in EKS, ECS, and Fargate to detect malicious activity including malicious file execution, privilege escalation, container escape, process injection, cryptocurrency mining, command and control communication, Tor network usage, reverse shells, fileless execution, and defense evasion techniques. Uses runtime logs containing process, file, and network activity context.
When generated
- ›Cryptocurrency-related IP addresses queried from EC2 instance or container
- ›Command and control server communication detected from runtime processes
- ›Tor network connections detected (relay or client activity)
- ›Blackhole or drop point traffic patterns detected
- ›New binary execution detected on instance or container
- ›Docker socket accessed for privilege escalation
- ›Container escape attempts via runc or CGroups modification
- ›Process injection attempts detected (proc, ptrace, virtual memory write)
- ›Reverse shell connections initiated from instances or containers
- ›Fileless execution detected (code execution without disk writes)
- ›Cryptocurrency miner execution detected
- ›New libraries loaded into running processes
- ›Container mounting host directories detected
- ›Suspicious tool or command execution detected
- ›Ptrace anti-debugging techniques detected
- ›Malicious file execution detected
- ›Suspicious shell creation from network services
- ›Privilege escalation to root via suspicious setuid execution
- ›Kernel module loaded on EC2 instance
Security relevance
CriticalCompliance
Frequency notes
Runtime Monitoring findings vary significantly based on workload activity, container usage, and threat landscape. Production environments typically see 20-80 findings per day. Cryptocurrency mining and C&C activity are high-severity but lower frequency (5-20 per day). Process injection, container escape, and privilege escalation are critical but rare (1-10 per day). Suspicious command execution is common but lower severity (10-50 per day). Kernel module loading is very rare but critical (0-2 per day). Frequency increases during active attacks and decreases during quiet periods.
Resources
Docs and tools
Generation
Configuration
- Base frequency
- 60 events/hour
- Time patterns
- business_hours night_hours weekend
- Business hours
- 2.0x
- Night hours
- 2.5x
- Weekend
- 1.5x
Schema
Field definitions
Field reference for this event type — types, requirements, examples, and allowed values.
detail.type
Runtime Monitoring finding type indicating attack tactic and detection method
Source: random_choice() of 42 Runtime Monitoring finding types
Execution:Runtime/MaliciousFileExecuted-
CryptoCurrency:Runtime/BitcoinTool.BInstance or container querying IP associated with cryptocurrency activity -
Backdoor:Runtime/C&CActivity.BInstance or container querying IP associated with known C&C server -
UnauthorizedAccess:Runtime/TorRelayInstance or container making connections to Tor network as relay -
UnauthorizedAccess:Runtime/TorClientInstance or container making connections to Tor Guard or Authority node -
Trojan:Runtime/BlackholeTrafficBlackhole traffic pattern detected -
Trojan:Runtime/DropPointDropPoint trojan activity detected -
Execution:Runtime/NewBinaryExecutedNew binary execution detected on instance or container -
PrivilegeEscalation:Runtime/DockerSocketAccessedDocker socket accessed for privilege escalation -
PrivilegeEscalation:Runtime/RuncContainerEscapeContainer escape attempt via runc detected -
PrivilegeEscalation:Runtime/CGroupsReleaseAgentModifiedCGroups release agent modified for container escape -
DefenseEvasion:Runtime/ProcessInjection.ProcProcess injection via /proc filesystem detected -
DefenseEvasion:Runtime/ProcessInjection.PtraceProcess injection via ptrace detected -
Execution:Runtime/ReverseShellReverse shell connection detected -
DefenseEvasion:Runtime/FilelessExecutionFileless execution detected (code execution without disk writes) -
Impact:Runtime/CryptoMinerExecutedCryptocurrency miner execution detected -
Execution:Runtime/MaliciousFileExecutedKnown malicious executable file execution detected -
PrivilegeEscalation:Runtime/ElevationToRootPrivilege escalation to root via suspicious setuid execution -
DefenseEvasion:Runtime/KernelModuleLoadedKernel module loaded on EC2 instance indicating kernel-level access attempt
detail.resource.resourceType
Type of resource where runtime activity was detected
Source: random_choice(['Instance', 'EKSCluster', 'ECSTask', 'Container'])
Instance-
InstanceAmazon EC2 instance -
EKSClusterAmazon EKS cluster -
ECSTaskAmazon ECS task -
ContainerContainer running on instance or in cluster
detail.resource.instanceDetails.instanceId
EC2 instance identifier (when resourceType is Instance)
Source: random_hex(17, 17) with 'i-' prefix
i-{17 hex characters}i-1234567890abcdef0detail.resource.containerDetails
Container details (when resourceType is Container or ECSTask)
Source: Container metadata from runtime environment
{containerRuntime, id, name, image, securityContext}detail.service.runtimeDetails.process
Process information that triggered the finding
Source: Process metadata from runtime agent
{name, pid, ppid, user, executablePath, commandLine}detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.name
Name of the process executable
Source: Process executable path from runtime agent
Full path to executable/usr/bin/python3detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.pid
Process ID (PID) of the process
Source: Process ID from operating system
Integer (1-65535)1234detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.ppid
Parent process ID (PPID) of the process
Source: Parent process ID from operating system
Integer (1-65535)1detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.user
User name running the process
Source: User name from process credentials
Usernamerootdetail.service.runtimeDetails.process.userId
User ID (UID) of the process owner
Source: User ID from process credentials (0 for root)
Integer (typically 0-65535)0detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.euid
Effective user ID (EUID) of the process
Source: Effective user ID from process credentials
Integer (typically 0-65535)0detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.parentName
Name of the parent process executable
Source: Parent process executable path from runtime agent
Full path to parent executable/usr/sbin/sshddetail.service.runtimeDetails.process.executablePath.text
Full path to the process executable. Note: File paths may be controlled by malicious actors and should be sanitized when displayed
Source: Executable file path from runtime agent
Absolute file path/usr/bin/python3detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.executableSha256
SHA-256 hash of the executable file
Source: SHA-256 hash of executable file content
64-character hexadecimal stringa1b2c3d4e5f6...detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.commandLine.text
Command line used to execute the process. Note: Command lines may be controlled by malicious actors and should be sanitized when displayed
Source: Process command line arguments from runtime agent
Command line stringpython3 -c "import socket; s=socket.socket(); s.connect((\"203.0.113.1\", 4444))"detail.service.runtimeDetails.process.workingDirectory.text
Working directory of the process. Note: File paths may be controlled by malicious actors and should be sanitized when displayed
Source: Working directory path from runtime agent
Absolute directory path/tmpdetail.service.runtimeDetails.context.runtimeContext
Runtime context information including memory regions and address space flags
Source: Runtime context metadata from runtime agent
{addressSpaceFlags, memoryRegions, toolName}detail.service.runtimeDetails.context.runtimeContext.toolName
Name of the tool or utility used (for SuspiciousTool findings)
Source: Tool name identified by runtime agent
Tool namecurldetail.service.action.networkConnectionAction.remoteIpDetails.ipAddressV4
Remote IP address for network-based findings
Source: random_public_ip() for network connection findings
IPv4 address203.0.113.42detail.service.action.dnsRequestAction.domain
Domain name queried for DNS-based findings
Source: random_choice() of test and malicious domains for DNS findings
Domain nameguarddutyc2activityb.comdetail.service.additionalInfo.threatListName
Name of threat intelligence list that matched
Source: random_choice() of threat intelligence list names
Threat list nameAmazon-
AmazonAWS threat intelligence (includes Log4j-related threats) -
ProofPointProofPoint threat intelligence feed -
Custom Threat ListCustom user-defined threat list -
AWS Threat IntelligenceAWS managed threat intelligence -
Community Threat ListCommunity-maintained threat list
detail.service.additionalInfo.threatName
Name of the specific threat identified
Source: random_choice() of threat names
Threat nameC&C Server-
C&C ServerCommand and control server -
Bitcoin MiningCryptocurrency mining activity -
Tor NetworkTor network node -
Log4j RelatedLog4j vulnerability exploitation -
Malicious BinaryKnown malicious executable -
Container EscapeContainer escape technique
detail.severity
Finding severity level (0-10)
Source: random_choice([2, 2, 5, 5, 5, 8, 8, 8])
8-
2Low severity (1.0-3.9) - e.g., SuspiciousShellCreated, Discovery:Runtime/SuspiciousCommand -
5Medium severity (4.0-6.9) - e.g., ElevationToRoot, Persistence:Runtime/SuspiciousCommand -
8High severity (7.0-8.9) - e.g., MaliciousFileExecuted, C&CActivity, TorClient, KernelModuleLoaded